Federalismo Fiscal, Rentismo Subnacional y Democracia Provincial

Presentación del tema: "Federalismo Fiscal, Rentismo Subnacional y Democracia Provincial"— Transcripción de la presentación:

1 Federalismo Fiscal, Rentismo Subnacional y Democracia Provincial
Carlos Gervasoni Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

2 Motivaciones (circa 2004) Sustantivas-Teóricas: Gran producción académica sobre regímenes nacionales pero prácticamente ninguna sobre regímenes subnacionales (Hill 1994; Cornelius 1999; Snyder 1999; McMann&Petrov 2000; Gibson 2005; Lankina&Getachew 2006) Normativas I: Preocupación por regímenes poco democráticos en varias provincias (Catamarca, San Luis, Santiago del Estero), mejor documentada por el periodismo que por la CP (por ejemplo Morandini 1991; Wiñazki 1995; Mochkofsky 2003; Carreras 2004). Normativas II: Feedback nacional. Experiencia reciente del Menemismo, breve (pero revelador) interinato de Rodríguez Saá, e inicios del Kirchnerismo: patrón común de gobernadores de provincias escasamente democráticas devenidos presidentes. Metodológica: Necesidad de adaptar y/o desarrollar estrategias de operacionalización del concepto de democracia al nivel subnacional.

3 Punto de partida: ¿Por qué hay desde 1983 Provincias más y menos Democráticas?
La investigación parte de un interrogante clásico de la ciencia política, pero aplicado al nivel subnacional. Gran producción teórica y empírica sobre las causas de la democracia y el autoritarismo a nivel nacional desde hace décadas. Pero producción escasa y reciente sobre democracia subnacional: Theoretical approach Authors Evidence from… Year Modernization McMann&Petrov Russia 2000 Strategic “boundary control” Gibson S. del Estero & Oaxaca (Mexico) 2005 Economic autonomy McMann Russia & Kyrgyzstan 2006 Diffusion Lankina&Getachew Natural-resource rents Goldberg, Wibbels & Mvukiyehe USA 2008 Fiscal federalism rents Gervasoni Argentina 2010 Cultural Legacies India 2012

4 Democracia y Autoritarismo a Nivel Nacional: Dos Tradiciones de Medición
Objective indicators: usually focus on a few easily-observable institutional features or electoral outcomes such as presence of electoral institutions, rotation in office, margin of victory, turnout, etc. (e.g., Przeworski et al.; Vanhanen). Popular at the subnational level: Hill 1994 (USA); Beer&Mitchel 2006 (India); Borges 2007 (Brazil); Goldberg et al (USA); Giraudy 2009 (Argentina&Mexico); Gervasoni 2010a (Argentina). Subjective (or perception-based) indicators: usually focus on many aspects of democracy as described by secondary sources or experts (e.g., Freedom House index, Polity IV). Some of these aspects may be quite difficult to assess: freedom of expression, effectiveness of checks and balances, “soft” repression etc. Less common in subnational studies: McMann (2006) & Petrov (2005) expert surveys for Russia; Gervasoni (2010b) expert survey for Argentina.

5 Special Problem: Measuring Subnational Regimes is Harder
In many countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, USA, etc.) subnational units are institutionally similar and democratic  More measurement error. Where national regime is democratic, subnational units are constrained in the extent to which they can be authoritarian  Narrower range, smaller variance. Secondary data sources often weak and non-comparable  More measurement error. Measurement reliability depends both on measurement error (higher in subnational settings) and substantive variance (smaller in subnational settings).

6 A graphical (unidimensional) view of the problem
: Burma Canada Cuba San Luis Mendoza Finland N. Korea Spain S. Arabia Uruguay Authoritarianism Hybrid Regimes Democracy NON-ELECTORAL ELECTORAL REGIMES REGIMES

7 Medición: Estrategias Objetiva y Subjetiva
Objetiva: indicadores de 1) Supermayorías electorales (ejecutivo), 2) Supermayorías electorales (legislativo), 3) Supermayorías legislativas (escaños), 4) Alto control de sucesión, y 5) Reglas permisivas de reelección. Índice cuatrienal (vía análisis factorial) para 22 provincias desde (Hasta 2003 en Gervasoni, C “A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes.” World Politics 62(2) y hasta 2007 en Gervasoni [tesis doctoral]). Subjetiva: Encuesta de Expertos en Política Provincial: Decenas de indicadores de democracia codificados por expertos en la política de cada provincia (23 provincias y CABA, ; N=24). (Gervasoni, C “Measuring Subnational Regimes: Results from an Expert-Based Operationalization of Democracy in the Argentine Provinces.” Journal of Politics in Latin America 2(2), y, más detalladamente, en Gervasoni 2011 [tesis doctoral]).

8 Advantages and Disadvantages of Objective and Subjective Indicators of Democracy

9 Estrategia Objetiva Lógica: “Democracy is a system in which (incumbent) parties lose elections”; “no country in which a party wins 60 percent of the vote twice in a row is a democracy”, (Przeworski 1991). “In designing the objective measurement strategy, I assume that authoritarian practices … increase the probability of extended stints of single party rule, unusually large electoral majorities for incumbents, overwhelming executive control of the legislature, no term limits […] Regime type is not defined by any of these traits in particular, but, following the logic of “effect indicators” (Bollen and Lennox 1991), they should reflect changes in the underlying level of democracy.” “This is the reasoning behind the common argument that no country in which incumbents win more than 60% or 70% of the votes or seats is likely to be a democracy (Przeworski 1991; Alvarez et al. 1996; Vanhanen 2000). If democracy requires “an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections” (Alvarez et al. 1996, 5), provinces like Formosa or San Luis, where the same party has controlled the governorship for 7 (now 8) consecutive terms since —often obtaining over 70% of the vote— are less democratic than Entre Ríos or Mendoza, where different parties have alternated in office, and where incumbents have seldom obtained more than 50% of the vote.”

10 The Index of Subnational Democracy and Its Components (1983-2007)

11 Evolución Temporal: Creciente Varianza Interprovincial

12 Estrategia Subjetiva Lógica: Aprovechar el conocimiento detallado y cercano del régimen que tienen expertos (Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán 2001 y Bowman, Lehoucq&Mahoney 2005), en este caso expertos residentes en la provincia y formalmente encuestados. “The operationalization strategy via a survey of experts has the following advantages: it starts with clear and “thick” definition of the concept to be measured, it identifies in detail dimensions, subdimensions, components and subcomponent of this definition, it develops specific indicators for each subcomponent, improving on national indices, it measures each indicator several times (by using multiple measures –items– and by measuring each several times –experts–), because of these multiple measurements, it produces the information necessary to assess the uncertainty of the descriptive inferences (King, Keohane and Verba 1994), it makes the procedures public by clearly describing each of the methodological decisions made.

13 Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics (SEPP) (Encuesta de Expertos en Política Provincial [EEPP])
General design: Face-to-face structured interviews with local experts. About 3 years including design, fieldwork and analysis. Sample: N=155; Four to twelve (avg.=6.46) intentionally-selected experts per province in the 24 districts. Experts are politically independent social scientist (preferably in academia) and journalists. Questionnaire: Structured, with closed-ended followed by open-ended questions (about 150 variables, 100 about regimes). Avg. duration 1:19 hours. Factual questions about period. Pretest: 14 Interviews. Fieldwork: Project director and 4 RAs. Two stages; April to November Very high response rate (around 81%).

14 “Thickness”: Disaggregation of the Concept of Subnat. Democracy
Table 2. The Operational Dissagregation of the Degree of Subnational Democracy. “Thickness”: Disaggregation of the Concept of Subnat. Democracy

15 Index name Substantive content Items # Alpha First level indices Oppos_leaders_idx Frequency of government sanctions against opposition politic. 33a-e, 34 6 0.89 35_idx Intensity of govt. sanctions against critical public employees 35a-d 4 0.91 Free_protest_idx General population´s freedom to criticize government /protests 36, 37, 38 3 0.93 40_idx General level of pro-incumbent media bias 40a-d 0.85 41_idx Proportion of critical in the local media 41a-b 2 0.96 43_idx Frequency of government sanctions against critical journalists 43a-f 0.87 45_idx Ease of access to varied media information about politics 45a-c Legislature_idx Extent to which legisl. has power and constrains the executive 3a, 5a, 5b and 6 0.94 Judiciary_idx Extent to which provincial supreme tribunal and lower courts are independent from and constrain the executive. 7, 8b, 10 0.88 11_idx Effectiveness of controls on the executive by AHA 11a-f 0.92 Fair_elec_idx Procedural fairness of last gubernatorial elections 19 to 25 7 Campaign_adv_idx Incumbent gubernatorial candidate advantage in terms of funds and media coverage during last campaign 32a-d 29_30 5 44_idx1 Scope of government measures to control the content of the media 44d-i 44_idx2 44a-c, j, k 0.73 47_idx Frequency of unjustified repression by provincial police 47a-f Social_control_idx Government control of society through indoctrination, restrictions on public information, spying, and police repression 46, 48, 49, 51 0.84 50_idx Government discrimination against minorities, . 50a-f 0.81 Second level indices Punish_oppon_idx Frequency of government sanctions against critical opposition politicians, journalists, public employees 33a-e, 34, 35a-d, 36 to 39, 43a-f 20 Media_indep_idx Extent to which there are alternative, diverse and critical sources of information (media outlets) about local politics 3l, 40a-d, 41a, 41b, 42, 45a-c 11

16 Resultados: Preguntas Desagregadas y Fácticas

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19 Items by Mean and Standard Deviation

20 Resultados de los 17 Índices

21 Resultados: Índice de “Ventaja Oficialista”

22 Resultados: Índice de “Elecciones justas”

23 Resultados: Índice de “Control Legislativo”

24 Resultados: Índice de “Control Judicial”

25 Interpretation of Factors: Repression and Incumbency Advantage

26 Objective and Subjective Indices Compared
Index name Substantive content R Free Protest General population’s freedom to criticize government and participate in protests 0.64** Media Independence (2nd level) Extent to which there are alternative, diverse and critical sources of information about local politics 0.60*** Campaign Advantage Incumbent candidate advantage in terms of funds and media coverage during last campaign 0.56*** 41_idx (Critical Journalists) Proportion of critical and non-critical journalists in the local media 0.55*** 40_idx (Media Bias) General (i.e., not campaign-specific) pro-incumbent media bias 0.54*** Judicial Control Extent to which provincial supreme tribunal and lower courts are independent and constrain executive 0.53*** Legislative Control Extent to which legislature has real power and constrains the executive 0.50** 43_idx (Pluralistic Media) Ease of access to varied media information about provincial politics 0.48** Fair Elections Procedural fairness of last gubernatorial elections 0.47** Punish Opponents (2nd level) Government sanctions against critical opposition politicians, journalists, employees, and citizens 0.41** 47_idx (Police Repression) Unjustified repression by provincial police 0.40* 44_idx2 (Soft Media Control) Scope of government measures to control the content of the media 0.39* 44_idx1 (Hard Media Control) 0.28 Totalitarian Control Government control of society via indoctrination, restrictions on information, spying, and repression 0.38* 35_idx (Punish Employees) Government sanctions against critical public employees 0.35* 43_idx (Punish Journalists) Government sanctions against critical journalists 0.33 Opposition Leaders Government sanctions against critical politicians 11_idx (Horizontal Accountability) Effectiveness of controls on the executive by agencies of horizontal accountability 50_idx (Government Discrimination) Government discrimination against groups defined by religion, ethnicity, etc. 0.05

27 Teoría Explicativa: Origen en la “Maldición de los Recursos” Política: Petróleo vs. Democracia
Estudiosos de la política de Medio Oriente acuñaron el concepto de rentier state, esto es, estados fiscalmente ricos, capaces de distribuir recursos generosamente casi sin cobrar impuestos gracias a la apropiación de enormes rentas petroleras (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi 1990; Luciani 1990). En un ya clásico artículo Michael Ross (UCLA) testeó la hipótesis estadísticamente con una gran muestra de países, concluyendo que, efectivamente, la disponibilidad de rentas petroleras (y gasíferas y minerales, no así las agrícolas) están asociadas con mayores niveles de autoritarismo (Ross, M “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, 3).

28 La “Maldición del Federalismo Fiscal”: Desequilibrio Fiscal Vertical vs. Estabilidad Macroeconómica
Wibbels (American Journal of Political Science, 2001), documenta estadísticamente, para países en desarrollo, una asociación positiva entre federalismo y 1) déficit fiscal, 2) inflación, 3) crisis macroeconómicas. Rodden y Wibbels (World Politics, 2002) refinan posteriormente el argumento, apuntando no al federalismo en general, sino al FF con altos desequilibrios fiscales verticales  allí donde las unidades subnacionales recaudan poco pero gastan mucho (p. ej. Argentina) habrá más problemas fiscales y macroeconómicos. Conclusión: ciertos tipos de FF pueden tener consecuencias perversas, esto es, negativas y no previstas. ¿Puede haber una “maldición del FF” política?

29 Idea Teórica Central: El Federalismo Fiscal como Fuente de Rentas
Si una provincia recibe transferencias federales muy generosas, esto es, muy por encima de la recaudación que podría lograr por sus propios medios, entonces esas transferencias son funcionalmente equivalentes a las rentas petroleras. Si, además, esa provincia hace un muy pequeño esfuerzo de recaudación propia (quizás debido a las generosas transferencias federales), podemos decir que se trata de una rentier province. Los gobiernos de provincias rentísticas gozan, entonces, de los beneficios políticos gastar una importante masa de recursos fiscales sin pagar los costos políticos de recaudar. Gervasoni, C “A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces”. World Politics 62, 2.

30 Estados Rentistas Subnacionales
Altos niveles de “unearned fiscal income” (tranferencias y regalías) Enormes burocracias provinciales Escasísima recaudación tributaria propia Gran dependencia de los actores políticos del presupuesto provincial “Provincias Fiscales” (Cao, Francés y Vaca, 1997). “Enfermedad Holandesa” (Capello, Figueras, Grión, Moncarz, 2008). “Rentier Regions” en Rusia (Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg 2005) “We argue that unearned income streams, particularly in the form of revenues from natural resource production or from budgetary transfers from the central government, transform regions dependent on these income sources into rentier regions” (Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg 2005).

31 El FF Argentino: Desequilibrio Vertical + Distribución Secundaria Desigual
El FF argentino está entre los que tienen mayores niveles de desequilibrio fiscal vertical del mundo: las provincias tienen grandes responsabilidades de gasto pero niveles modestos (y en varios casos bajísimos) de recaudación propia. Además, los criterios de distribución secundaria hacen que, en términos per capita, haya enormes diferencias en las transferencias federales que recibe cada provincia. Interesantemente, el factor que explica en mayor medida la distribución secundaria per capita no es el nivel de desarrollo, sino el tamaño de la población (algo de esto, pero no todo, puede ser explicado por cuestiones de escala).

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34 Evidencia Empírica: Cuantitativa y Cualitativa
Evidencia cuantitativa: regresiones de panel con el índice objetivo de democracia ( )  A mayor nivel de transferencias federales per capita, menor nivel de democracia (controlando por explicaciones alternativas como nivel de desarrollo). Evidencia cualitativa: entrevistas en profundidad en provincias rentísticas revelan un argumento recurrente: “El gobierno provincial logra la hegemonía política y electoral porque todo el mundo (trabajadores, desempleados, empresas, medios) depende de empleos, subsidios, contratos, y pauta del estado provincial”. ¿Cómo pueden estados provinciales como Formosa, La Rioja o Santiago del Estero financiar tantos empleados, subsidios y avisos?  Gracias a sus altas “rentas del federalismo fiscal”.

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36 Mecanismos Causales “No taxation without representation”: Los gobernantes no dependen fiscalmente de los ciudadanos; los ciudadanos tienen menos poder. “Spending effect” (Ross 2001): abultado gasto público permite comprar apoyo via clientelismo: intercambio de empleos, planes sociales, compras gubernamentales y pauta por apoyo político. “Economic autonomy” (McMann 2006): Microfundación de esta causalidad macro: “where lavish public spending provides incumbents with powerful financial carrots and sticks, economically vulnerable citizens tend to support them or withdraw from political participation” “Repression effect”: alguna evidencia (por ejemplo en Santiago del Estero) pero de aplicación general dudosa por la lógica “híbrida”.

37 Evidencia sobre Mecanismos Causales
Media reports: Santa Cruz (after La Rioja the province with the most public employees per capita) reports a climate of media self-censorship and public acquiescence, which is attributed to the fear of losing state-provided benefits (Mochkofsky 2003). Academic case studies: Carlos Juarez’s regime was buttressed by his “control over a vast patronage machine, funded by central government transfers;” this machine “dwarfed all other economic activities in the province” (Gibson 2005). A study of San Luis states that provincial economy “depends heavily on federal tax revenues,” which have permitted ARS “to maintain the vast public works projects that have kept the population dependent on the government for jobs and housing and therefore subdued.” (Chavez 2003).

38 Conclusiones El FF genera, bajo condiciones de elevado DFV y distribución secundaria desigual, estados rentísticos subnacionales. Estos estados no derivan sus rentas del petróleo u otros recursos naturales (salvo en unos pocos casos como Neuquén y Santa Cruz) sino fundamentalmente de las transferencias del FF. Hay razones teóricas y evidencia empírica para sostener que, así como las rentas de los recursos debilitan a la democracia nacional, las rentas del federalismo fiscal debilitan a la democracia provincial. Nuestro FF podría entonces tener tres efectos perversos: contribuir 1) a la inestabilidad macroeconómica (Rodden y Wibbels), 2) a la inequidad de ingreso territorial (gráficos), 3) a la “enfermedad holandesa” y 4) a la consolidación de regímenes provinciales dudosamente democráticos.